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The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Republic of China on
 
Taiwan (ROC) are the two of Asia's celebrated "Four Tigers" which
 
may properly be regarded as having national economies. The
 
economic, social and political success attained by these two
 
nations and the significant support which they have received in
 
that process has led to a seemingly endless analysis. The key
 
argument has been that if foreign aid can be demonstrated to have
 
been significant in their achievement of such rapid progress then
 
their experience can be transferred to other struggling nations.
 
The economic miracles of Korea and Taiwan are well
 
documented. In each there was a single-minded determination
 
support national independence and, in the process, to escape
 
poverty and demonstrate the superiority of thei. governments and
 
rystems over those of their Communist countrymen. Economic
 
success was a means to an end. It was a weapon to be used
 
against dangerous and ever--present enemies end, as such, was
 
required to be efficient and productive. The policies and
 
systems which leaders in Korea and the ROC sought were those
 
which worked.
 
The paths to success of these two tigers were very
 
different. Taiwan moved quickly following 1949 to establish the
 
economic conditions for a rapidly growing economy in order to
 
support its massive defense requirements. It is often forgotten
 
in the clamor of the "China Lobby" that U.S. support for the ROC
 
immediately following the escape to Taiwan was luke-warm at best.
 
U.S. officials had long since lost patience with Chiang Kai­
Shek's corrupt and ineffective government. U.S. assistance began
 
to flow in 1951 following the invasion of South Korea and a
 
renewal of U.S. concern for the Communist threat in Asia. By

that time much of the groundwork for future success on Taiwan was
 
underway.
 
Korea faced a more certain flow of assistance if not a
 
brighter fature economically. The U.S. had partitioned Korea at
 
the end of World War II as part of its misguided appeasement of
 
the Soviet Union. The invasion by Kim Il Sung and Mao Tse Tung

finally awakened the Truman administration to the realities of 
Communism in Asia.
 
The moral responsibility for South Korea's security rested
 
clearly and completely with the United States. Syngman Rhee's
 
post-war government was adept at using this responsibility as a
 
lever for prying massive economic assistance from the U.S. As
 
with African programs of later years, the guilt stimulus of the
 
aid flow meant that there were few economic policy strings
 
attached and those which existed were easily ignored. Only with
 
the reduction of aid beginning in 1958, the toppling of the Rhee
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government and the economic reforms begun by Park Chung Hee in
 
1961 was economic policy intentionally turned toward growth.
 
On Taiwan the new ruling elite were from the Chinese
 
mainland and viewed Taiwan as a temporary resting place prior to
 
their return to their rightful position at home. Under the
 
Japanese, Taiwan had been administered in a manner very similar
 
to Korea. The economic bond with Japan was, however, much
 
looser. Korea was intended to be an integral part of the
 
Japanese home economy, a gateway to Manchuria and the Chinese
 
heartland. Taiwan was to be a source of basic raw materials and
 
agricultural products.
 
The rulers who came to Taiwan from the mainland brought with
 
them a superior level of education. From the beginning, most of
 
the technical people on Taiwan had been trained in U.S.
 
universities and there was a long tradition of contact: between
 
the kind of people represented by the foreign aid administrators
 
and their Chinese opposite numbers. Korea was markedly
 
different. There were fewer people with university training

since the Japanese had restricted Korean access to higher
 
education. Among Korean aid administrators prior to the Park
 
period, very few had been to the United States or shared the same
 
educational experience as the aid administrators with whom they
 
worked.
 
The major similarity of these two economies was poverty. At
 
the beginning of their drives to industrialization they were the
 
poorest nations in Asia. At the end of the Korean war, South
 
Korea lagged behind every nation in Asia including the Indian
 
subcontinent. At the time, both nations could looh to the
 
Philippines as a target for their aspirations.
 
In the final analysis, the economic miracles of the ROC and
 
ROK were simple matters from a policy point of view. Market­
oriented allocation mechanisms were introduced whi:h distributed 
resources according to prices rather than fiat. Economic
 
assistance was used initially in the process of implementing
 
these policies as a substitute for domestic savings and private
 
capital flows if not always in the manner prescribed by aid
 
administrators. In both economies, however, when tHi(e composition 
of aid turned from grants to loans, market pricing led to an 
almost immediate shift from official to private capit-al. flows. 
It sounds easy and, therefore, begs to be transferred to
 
other nations which have struggled for decades with the issue of
 
economic development only to remain poor.
 
The problem is that the question of "how" is inadequate.
 
The question of "why" the ROC and ROK succeeded while others
 
failed is central to transferring relevant lessons both to poor
 
nations and to the aid agencies of their wealthy benefactors.
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The analysis which follows is designed to link the how and the
 
why of economic growth. In some. cases, there exists no direct
 
evidence of why one policy was chosen over another. The
 
reasoning can only be inferred from the choices. 
 In many cases,

the issue arises only because the policy choices of the Koreans
 
and Chinese conflicted with those prescribed by "development

economists." No American entrepreneur would find the choices
 
anything but natural.
 
THE COMMON FACTORS IN ROK/ROC AID
 
Despite the differences in starting conditions of the two
 
economies, there were a number of essential common 
factors in
 
their economic policy formation including administration of
 
foreign aid programs. Given the success of the two economies,
 
these factors may be candidates for a list of necessary
 
conditions for a successful aid program. i.e., in their absence
 
an aid program is unlikely to be successful and, therefore,
 
should not be undertaken with the goal of economic growth.
 
1. 	 Single Donor: Each nation had a single aid source: the
 
people of the United States.
 
2. 	 Joint Administr'ation: The ROC and ROK governments

jointly administered every aspect of their aid programs
 
with U.S. officials. In the case of the ROC, aid
 
administrators were individuals immediately responsible

for the economic success of the nation.
 
. Common Education: In the case of Taiwan, officials
 
from both sides had received the same education.
 
Almost all held Ph.D. degrees from top U.S.
 
universities. In Korea, President Park brought in as
 
senior advisors recent U.S. graduate economists
 
although there was less participation by them in the
 
aid program per se than in economic policy-making. In
 
Korea, U.S. military training played a significant
 
role.
 
4. 	 Lack of Vested Interests: The ROC gove-nment, recently

transplanted from the mainland, had no vested interests
 
in the economy on Taiwan. In post-war Korea there was 
virtually no productive enterprise in whicl to have a 
vested interest. In every sense of the word there was 
as close to a level playing field in these countries as
 
is possible to achieve.
 
5. 	 Incentive Driven Productivity Advances: In both
 
countries, agricultural and industrial economic
 
policies were designed around market incentives.
 
Production decisions were made in relation to the
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market rather than in relation to ideological or
 
philosophical beliefs.. Resources for increasing
 
productivity were channeled to those areas where
 
profits were possible.
 
6. 	 Basic Economic Relationships Respected: Tn major
 
economic decisions, notably the much discussed land
 
reform programs, basic economic relationships were
 
respected. Property rights were respected for both old
 
and new owners with the former receiving genuine
 
payment and the latter an immediately enforceable
 
property right. Land transfers made owners not out of
 
peasant tillers but out of the traditional managers of
 
the farms, a significant difference and one almost
 
totally ignored in recent efforts at land
 
redistribution.
 
7. 	 Import-led Growth Policies: Imports were of great
 
importance to the economic policy makers of Taiwan and
 
Korea. There was an explicit recognition that people
 
work 	for rewards and that, after basic suirvival is
 
achieved, their level of effort depends to a great
 
extent on the material rewards to be achieved.
 
A SINGLE DONOR
 
In the current climate of multiple aid donors, each with its
 
own priorities and policy views, it is difficult to imagine the
 
relative ease of administration achievable with a single donor.
 
Not only were the donor and recipient able to build a more solid
 
working partnership, they each knew that the success or failure
 
of their enterprise rested on them alone and that they would be
 
judged accordingly.
 
From the Chinese side, there were no opportunities for
 
shopping around the pet projects of a given official or interest
 
group. Moreover, continued presentation of bad projects could be
 
expected to lead to a reduction or cessation of aid. 'withno
 
alternative sources this was to be avoided at all. :osts.
 
From the U.S. side, there were two clear challenges on
 
Taiwan. First and foremost was enticing the Nationalist
 
government of Chiang Kai Shek to aid in the defense of South
 
Korea. Startled into action by the invasion of North Korea, U.S.
 
aid began to flow almost immediately. The value of a strong ally
 
on Taiwan in the event of Mainland intervention in Korea was
 
apparent, if only after the invasion. Second, the newly felt
 
Communist threat required a demonstration of superiority over the
 
Communist system.
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Much has been made in the literature of the wise husbanding

of aid resources by ROC officials. The existence of a single

donor was partially responsible. Unlike the World Bank, the
 
United Nations and other multilateral (and some bilateral) aid
 
sources, USAID did not take as its measure of success the level
 
of taxpayers dollars sent ab-oad. Therefore, there was no
 
insistence from the donor on yearly increases in aid flows.
 
This point is hard to overemphasize. There "are
cur,,2ntly
 
more than ten major aid donors. Each competes for projects and
 
each owes its bureaucratic position to levels of lending rather
 
than to levels of economic growth in recipient nations.
 
Taiwan and Korea were under constant pressure to achieve
 
economic independence rather than to absorb more aid. They were
 
under intense pressure to undertake political reforms as well,
 
particularly in Korea. Beginning in the mid-1950"s, the U.S.
 
increasingly tried to use the aid lever to persuade Syngman Rhee
 
to democratize his government and reduce the level of corruption

which surrounded him.' On his part, Rhee put at the top of his
 
policy agenda the extraction of as large an amount of U.S. aid as
 
possible. To this end, the Korean government regularly
 
understated the size of their agricultural output and used much
 
of their extremely scarce professional economic manpower for the
 
production of spurious projections based upon the now discredited
 
"two gap" economic models. A perveise result was that U.S. aid
 
was significantly and rapidly reduced just as the reforms of the
 
Park government were taking hold.2
 
Another issue which should not be overlooked is the
 
relationship of military assistance to economic assistance.
 
First, the vast majority of all aid which went to Taiwan was for
 
security. Of the total of US$4.0 billion provided to Taiwan from
 
1951 to 1965, US$2.5 billion was for military assistance.' For
 
the U.S. Congress, the security situation was the major

justification for economic assistance. Current programs of
 
military assistance continue to be bilateral and cooperative
 
while economic assistance is primarily multilateral and
 
competitive.
 
The Korean situation was similar if somewhat less elegant.

Aid to Korea was initially provided in profusion to bolster a
 
political ally at a time of great poverty, national economic
 
chaos and under threat of armed invasion. It was continued for a
 
decade to maintain relative stability despite economic policies
 
which were roundly condemned by the U.S. officials who
 
administered the aid program.
 
Economic aid to Korea began to decline at a time when Korean
 
policies had changed and rapid autonomous economic growth was
 
under way. The decision to reduce economic aid had more to do
 
with the stabilized security situation along with competition
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from the emerging African states with their strong constituency
 
within the Kennedy Administration than with cooperation on
 
economic policy.
 
JOINT ADMINISTRATION
 
Unlike any current major aid programs, the ROC and ROK
 
programs were jointly administered by the donor and the
 
recipients. This was true at every level of the administrative
 
hierarchy for both military and economic assistance. In Korea,
 
U.S. assistance went clear to the grass roots as was demanded by

the decimation of South Korea's manpower by the war. Cooperation
 
was more genuine and fruitful on Taiwan than in Korea due to the
 
problems with the Rhee government cited previously. Both,
 
however, went to a cooperative level politically impossible
 
today.
 
The Economic Stabilization Board and the Joint Commission
 
for Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), both in the ROC, provide useful
 
examples.
 
The Economic Stabilization Board was created in 1953 to
 
enhance cooperation and to coordinate efforts which had been
 
previously directed by USAID on the American side and the Council
 
for U.S. Aid (CUSA) on the Chinese side. It was chaired by the
 
Deputy Prime Minister who also chaired CUSA. Chinese members
 
included the Minister of Finance, Governor of the Central Bank,
 
the Commissioner of Safety and the Chairman of JCRR. U.S.
 
members included the USAID director, the economic counsel of the
 
U.S. Embassy, and the chief economist of USAID mission.
 
The ESB was divided into four operational committees each of
 
which had an American member. Thus, the joint nature of policy

decision making from the ESB was continued in joint

implementation by the operations staff.
 
The JCCR was created in 1948 prior to the loss of the
 
mainland. When it was moved to Taiwan in 1949, there were five
 
commissioners. Two were appointed by the U.S. president, three
 
by the Chinese president. The Chairman of the commission was
 
selected from the Chinese members. Under the commissioners were
 
about 30 senior staff. In most years, 10-1.5 of these weri
 
American. The remaining were Chinese who, in almost every case,
 
had been educated in the U.S.
 
By 1959 the United States was spending more aid money in
 
Korea than anywhere else. The Office of Economic Coordinator
 
(OEC), which administered the aid program at the time, was
 
involved directly in transportation, power, industry,

agriculture, mining, public works, communications, community
 
development, health and sanitation, program information, and
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participant training. There were some large scale construction
 
projects (the show pieces of foreign aid programs elsewhere) but
 
the direct presence of the U.S. administrators at the lowest
 
levels also permitted a multitude of very small scale projects.
 
The support provided by the U.S. did not become lodged at
 
the top of the economy but instead permeated every level. Aid
 
projects involved railroad cars, repair shops, small and large

electricity generating plants, flour mills, fertilizer plants,

and small roads as well as major highways. Aid administrators
 
were found everywhere. Irrigation, hospitals, public wells,

publications, classrooms and the curriculum of the schools which
 
used those rooms, telephone lines and switching equipment, and
 
housing, the list seems incredible beside the relatively few big

projects conducted by our largest foreign aid programs today.4
 
COMMON EDUCATION
 
Much is made in the "development community" of the need to
 
establish a common ground between aid donors and recipients.
 
This usually is required for the donor to understand why the
 
recipient wastes scarce resources. In the case of aiwan
 
throughout and Korea in the later periods, the problem of mutual
 
understanding did not exist.
 
The vast majority of officials in the ROC government were
 
U.S. educated. Indeed, most of those at senior levels of groups

such as the JCRR held advanced degrees from top U.S.
 
universities. In their discussions of policy there was no need
 
to establish a common ground of theory or historical czontext.'
 
On economic issues, this common ground had a further aspect
which is decidedly different from later experience. All of the
 
economists participating in establishing the policies which led
 
to the economic miracle, American and Chinese, were trained in
 
classic Marshallian economics. The behavioral theories on which
 
they based policy prescriptions were those of marginal analysis
 
both for the individual and the firm.
 
All of those who established the basic policies on Taiwan
 
were educated prior to the infusion of either Keynesian

macroeconomic theory or "development economics" into the 
curricula of U.S. universities. To be sure, these ideas were in 
the universities of the time and were driving forces in U.S. and
 
European policy debates. However, the fundamental training of
 
the individuals involved in forming economic policies on Taiwan
 
had not included them. Later participants, especially the
 
Harvard group which poured into Washington and Taipei in 1961,
 
were filled with the new theories. By the time of their arrival,
 
however, the die was cast.
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In the years immediately following the WWII, Korea was
 
markedly different. There were fewer people with university

training since the Japanese had restricted Korean access to
 
higher education. Of those who had been to university very few
 
had been to the United States or shared the same educational
 
experience as the aid administrators with whom they worked.
 
With the arrival of Park Chung Hee this situation began to
 
change. With the return to Korea of men such as Dr. Nam Duck Woo
 
in the early 1960's, Park found a ready source of economic
 
talent. It is interesting to note that these Korean economists
 
did not, in general, come from the same level of U.S. university
 
as had their Chinese counterparts. The Koreans had attended such
 
universities as Oklahoma (Nam) and Missouri (Kim Mahn Je) which,
 
unlike their Eastern counterparts, had not accepted the non­
market ideas of "development economics." '
 
More importantly, Park and his fellow military men were
 
themselves the product of U.S. training. They were the first
 
generation after the colonial period and were Western trained.
 
Six thousand had been to the U.S. for training.' These men had
 
learned well the requirements of managing a modern war machine
 
and represented the most highly trained institution in Korea.
 
LACK OF VESTED INTERESTS
 
Entrenched vested interests have plagued the attempts of
 
almost every nation at making the transition from a stagnant to a
 
growing economy. Always the product of government collusion with
 
politically well-connected economic interests, these vested
 
interests stymie economic growth by blocking moves7 to establish
 
market driven solutions to economic problems. The post­
revolution Aquino government in the Philippines is a prime
 
example.
 
In the early years, both Korea and Taiwan faced economies
 
almost devoid of vested interests. In both, war played an
 
important role as major portions of the economic and social bases
 
were destroyed. This was particularly true of Korea where
 
millions were left homeless and wandered as refugees.
 
On Taiwan, the peculiar political situation played an
 
important role. When the Nationalist government fled to Taiwan
 
in 1949 it totally absorbed Taiwan from a political and military

point of view. Taiwan had always been a province of China but
 
had been occupied by Japan since 1895. Following World War II,
 
the growing crisis on the mainland had precluded active
 
Nationalist activity on Taiwan which would have led to the
 
establishment of economic vested interests. 
There was neither a
 
government ministry presence nor an economic presence.
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Once the Nationalists fled from the mainland, the government
 
was faced with a virtual tabula rosa from a policy standpoint.

Economic policy had a single focus, build as rapidly as possible
 
an economy which could support the required military
 
expenditures. With the exception of those industries believed
 
essential to national security (and in this context the Chinese
 
were more concerned with preparations for war than with the more
 
esoteric notions of national security which have plagued later
 
economic policy makers), economic policy makers faced their task
 
without preconceived notions of "appropriate" industries or
 
sectors.
 
Of course, there was great concern for the agricultiiral
 
sector. The Communist regime on the mainland had skillfully
 
exploited peasant grievances to advance its war on the
 
government. However, within the agricultural sector itself,

there were few preconceived notions. One great advantage faced
 
by the ESB and the JCRR was the total absence of a dedicated
 
agricultural bureaucracy. The Ministry of Agriculture and
 
Forestry itself had been disbanded along with many other
 
government bureaucracies in 1949. Functions deemed to b­
essential were transferred to a department under the Ministry of
 
Economic Affairs. Thus, the special interests normally found in
 
a ministry were suborainated to the overall economic health of
 
the nation.'
 
The industry of Taiwan was similarly stripped of vested
 
interests. The major corporations had been state-owned under the
 
Japanese.9 Government officials coming over from the mainland,
 
however, had none of the usual concerns which bureaucrats have
 
for such corporations. These were not their companies.
 
Moreover, they had little concern for the native Taiwanese
 
managers or workers. As with agriculture, this lack of vested
 
interest yielded the flexibility required for policy reform.
 
In Korea the pattern was similar if for differing reasons.
 
The Japanese had left in Korea a significant industrial economy.
 
In addition to the estimated 2,400 Korean-owned manufacturing

factories, from the departing Japanese the "Republic of Korea
 
inherited 2,500 operating industrial and biusiness enterprises, as
 
well as infrastructure, inventories, real estate, and 15 percent
 
of the iation's land."'°
 
Unfortunately, the Japanese left Korea without a governing

elite and with managers and technicians unused to controlling a
 
major enterprise. As history has shown there is no scarcity of
 
top talent in Korea but Koreans had to take over with little
 
warning and, due to the American administration, without complete

control. For its part, the American administration which took
 
over in 1945 had almost no interest in Korea and "managed" with
 
that attitude. Understandably, they just wanted to go home.
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The rudderless Korean economy was far from adjusted to the
 
new situation when it was further devastated by the Korean War.
 
This lengthy conflict saw armies fight their way the length of
 
the peninsula several times before an armistice was achieved.
 
The degree of devastation in Korea is hard for people today to
 
comprehend. The country was an inhospitable desert by comparison
 
with Taiwan.
 
While some enterprises emerged from both the post-WWII

neglect and the devastation of the Korean War itself, they were
 
economically insignificant in the national economy.
 
The political situation in Korea under Syngman Rhee was more
 
complex. Rhee himself had been out of Korea since 1912. The
 
majority of his supporters and high officials were patriots of
 
the colonial resistance. As such, they were essentially outside
 
of the contemporary attitudes in Korea. Rhee and his government
 
never succeeded in consolidating power in r.meaningful sense.
 
The Korean War interrupted all political progress. The Rhee
 
government lasted in the post-war period only until. the security

situation was sufficiently stabilized for it to be overthrown.
 
The military government of Park Chung Hee was not of the
 
Korean elite, however these are defined in such a chaotic period.
 
It was made up of men of practicality rather than ideology.

Although not outsiders as i-i the case of Chiang's government,

they were outside of the traditional econoinic power bases.
 
Hence, they had the same lack of concern for the selection of
 
economic winners and losers in a new Korean economy. Their
 
concern was that the economic policies - or lack of policies - of
 
the Rhee government were plunging the nation into economic chaos
 
with the potential of tempting Kim Ii Sung to test the resolve of
 
United Nations forces.
 
INCENTIVE DRIVEN PRODUCTIVITY ADVANCES
 
In both agriculture and industry, economic policies were
 
designed around market incentives. As with other positive
 
aspects of the Korean experience, these were delayed until the
 
Park reforms but the patterns in both the ROC and the ROK were
 
the same. Crops were grown and products manufactured to satisfy

the demands of ready customers.'' The decentralization of the
 
Taiwan aid program, which placed those allocating scarce
 
resources close to the end user, was important in gaining this
 
efficiency.
 
Even more important, however, were the interest rate
 
policies which recognized the real value of resources. Since the
 
aid programs were never large enough to replace private capital

flows, end users of capital were not tempted to waste it in
 
response to an artificially low price.
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The Korean experience with development of credit markets is
 
particularly instructive. The role of a financial system in any
 
economy is to mobilize domestic savings and allocate the
 
resulting investment resources to the most productive user. In
 
most of the less developed nations, governments pursue policies
 
which keep interest rates below market levels in the misguided

belief that a faster rate of investment will thus take place.

Officially, Korea in the early years after World War II was no
 
exception. However, there was one distinct difference between
 
Korea and the rest: the Korean government permitted the
 
evolution and continuation of a widespread capital market outside
 
the regulated banking and credit system.
 
This unorganized money market (UMM) had two effects. One
 
was to make loans available to borrowers who were prepared to
 
accept the higher cost of borrowing for more risky purposes,
 
entrepreneurs. 
The second effect was to ensure that interest
 
rates were higher for those borrowers who would have difficulty

getting loans from the official and regulated banks. Higher
 
interest rates in the UMM performed two functions:
 
1. 	 They ensured that loans went to the most productive

activity available and not to individuals favored by
 
the government.
 
2. 	 Higher interest rates led to higher rates of saving
 
among those who used the UMM. The UMM came to
 
represent up to 50% of the total savings in the
 
national financial system. 2
 
A major bottleneck in autonomous economic development has
 
been the lack of access to working capital for the vast majority

of the small productive enterprises in the economy. Centralized
 
allocation of financial capital, credit through state
 
cooperatives, and the tying of most loans to tangible assets, has
 
usually been the policy of aid supported governments. The curb
 
market helped Korea to have the aid sponsored institutions and to
 
follow the aid supported policies for credit distribution but at
 
the same time permit a healthy domestic credit market to allocate
 
working capital where its productivity was highest. This factor
 
in Korea's success cannot be overstated."'
 
.., in an economy characterized by labor surplus, the
 
predominance of the primary sector, and a small light­
manufacturing base, the majority of borrowers as well 
as
 
lenders would have consisted of agriculturalists, small
 
firms, and small retailers and wholesalers, who would
 
require financial resources for short-term periods
 
distributed in very small blocks, as compared with an
 
economy dominated by the non-primary sectors. Consequently,
 
in a competitive situation without government intervention,
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these characteristics of lender and borrowers would have
 
been conducive to the development of regionally based and
 
atomistic money and capital markets consisting of many

small-sized and specialized financial institutions. This,
 
in fact, was a role played by the unregulated money markets
 
in Korea.14
 
Whatever arguments may occur about the overall role of
 
financial liberalization on the rate of economic progress, the
 
fact remains that when interest rates were allowed to rise in the
 
regulated financial sector to something close to a true market
 
level in 1965 there was a dramatic expansion of the banking
 
system. The savings which had heretofore been distributed
 
through the UMM found their way rapidly into "legitimate"
 
financial institutions following partial deregulation.
 
Just as market pricing of credit led to its efficient
 
allocation, a similar situation existed for productive inputs.

Although scorned at the time, the unofficial "reallocation" of
 
some aid commodities played an important role in increasing
 
efficiency.
 
Of the $24 million worth of U.S. fertilizer, supplied each
 
year for sale to small farmers at fixed prices, a 'sizable'
 
proportion had actually wound up on the open market at
 
double the price. The fortunate middlemen: Rhee's
 
Liberals. 15 
Distributing resources at a price below the value of their
 
productivity will result in their dissipation through being put
 
into the hands of those who do not have the ability or the
 
willingness to use them most productively. President Rhee's
 
friends had every incentive to ensure that the fertilizer ended
 
up where it would be most productive and hence do the most good.
 
On the production side, market determined pricing played a
 
similar role. The case of banana growers on Taiwan provides an
 
insightful lesson on resource management as well as the
 
importance of open international markets.
 
Banana farmers were casual in their attitudes toward soil
 
erosion and maintenance of banana plants until the Japanese
 
liberalized their quota system in 1963. To that point, banana
 
exports had been limited to US$8 million annually. With the
 
quotas liberalized, exports rocketed to US$50-60 million per year

after 1968, an amount equal to total U.S. aid in previous years.

At once farmers began to improve soil conservation techniques

and, importantly, stake individual banana plants with bamboo
 
against the winds of yearly typhoons. 6
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Over the entire period, rice declined in importance for
 
Taiwan's farmers. This was largely due to the tax imposed on
 
rice through the government stabilization program. This program

required rice to be delivered to the government at set prices.

The land reform program, however, had left farmers free to
 
determine their own crop mix. In short order, they moved from
 
the high tax to the low tax crops. Thus, the politically

sensitive price of rice - considered to be an issue meriting
 
interference with the market - was controlled without
 
interference in other allocation decisions.
 
BASIC ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS RESPECTED
 
In order for any economic system to operate as an efficient
 
allocator of resources and, hence, as a system which maximizes
 
income and growth, it is necessary for the basic economic
 
relationships, both legal and customary, to be respected. As
 
with most economic phenomena, this is little more than common
 
sense. As such, it is most open to political manipulation and
 
the theories of academics.
 
One of the major factors in the success of the ROK and ROC
 
has been the respect for property rights and the economic values
 
associated with them. Nowhere was this better demonstrated than
 
in the highly successful land reform programs conducted in both
 
countries.
 
The essence of land reform is to disrupt patterns of
 
existing property rights so that markets for land allocate any

given piece of land to its most productive use. Often, this is
 
accompanied by a justification based on the "inequity" of
 
existing property rights or "injustice" in the manner in which
 
they were created. The term land reform implies that
 
reallocating land to a new set of owners is an economically
 
significant act. Only under very unusual circumstances, however,
 
will this "significance" be positive.
 
Any discussion of property rights must begin with the
 
recognition that all property rights were originally established
 
through force and distributed for the good of those with the
 
strength to establish them. Where this distribution was
 
accomplished with an eye to the welfare of the society and with
 
an equitable system of acquisition and transfer of property
 
rights, the mandate of the original power has been 1.eft
 
relatively unquestioned except by radical elements.
 
Where distribution has not been accomplished with an eye to
 
the general welfare and where the system of acquisition and
 
transfer has not been equitable, calls for reform of land tenure
 
arrangements have almost always been heard.
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The difficulty of reordering land tenure, however, is that
 
it requires a fundamental reordering of all property rights in
 
the society. This is true because the property right in the land
 
represents not only a claim on the output of the land but a
 
vested interest in the continuing output of land as a resource
 
which can be passed through the generations.
 
A great mistake of honorable land reformers is to believe
 
that those to whom they would transfer land have different
 
intentions from those from whom they obtain title. In fact,
 
their interests in perpetuating themselves and their families are
 
identical."
 
The political objective in land refoim is to increase the
 
stake of those working the land in the economy and society
 
without alienating those from whom property rights in the land
 
are taken. The process is nothing more than a Pareto optimality

exercise but one in which people die from starvation, war or both
 
if the formula is not correct.
 
The ROC and ROK governments were fortunate to get the
 
formula right. Two factors were in their favor. Most
 
importantly on Taiwan, none of the new ruling elite had a vested
 
interest in continuing existing land tenure patterns. For those
 
newly arrived from the mainland, there was little concern for the
 
"
property rights in the land of native Taiwanese.
 
In Korea, the tremendous landholding of the Japanese, who
 
had taken over almost all lands not previously under cultivation,
 
made the exercise less disruptive.
 
A second factor on Taiwan was the availability of the four
 
major government corporations. As with the land rights, the
 
newly arrived mainlanders had little concern for the ownership

distribution of these former Japanese government companies.

Therefore, if economic planners found it expedient to distribute
 
shares to the former land owners and this could be accomplished
 
with no harm to the national security, there was little
 
objection.
 
The land reform on Taiwan was conducted with conscious
 
regard for the economic relationships involved. Land owners were
 
viewed as people having a stake in the production of society if
 
exhibiting little regard for t ,ose producing it. instead of
 
confiscating their property right, it was traded for a property
 
right in another productive segment of the economy.
 
A significant part of the land reform success can be
 
attributed to this perspective. Other attempts at altering

traditional property rights, notably in El Salvador and Vietnam,
 
have resulted in alienation and, inevitably, bloodshed between
 
those whose lives were meant to be bettered.
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Another important aspect of. the Taiwan land reform was that
 it did not disrupt managerial responsibilities. The tillers of
 
land on Taiwan had traditionally been farm managers as well.
 
Little land was taken from professional managers and transferred
 
to common laborers. Thus, those who gained property rights were
 
fully capable of administering in an economic sense their stake
 
in the economy.
 
This is not to say that farm laborers might not, over time,

gain equal skill. It merely demonstrates that continuity in land
 
management coupled with establishment of an equitable system for
 
the guarantee and transfer of property rights leads quickly to
 
stability as well as to long term benefits.'"
 
A final aspect of the land reform on Taiwan which
 
corresponds to that of Korea and conflicts directly with those of
 
many current attempts is that the new land owners were provided

with genuine property rights. As soon as the land was paid for,

the owner had the right of sale. If this meant an accelerated
 
payment schedule was required, it was allowed.
 
The result was that farmers becaiie masters of the fate of

their families. They were free to 
continue in the competitive
 
world of intensive agriculture or to move on. The right to

capital earnedl through past labor truly was vested in themselves
 
and not tied to the form through which that capital might be
 
represented at a particular time.
 
The ability to take a genuine title and right of sale also
 
avoided trapping valuable labor in agricultural pursuits as real
 
profits and wages rose in industrial enterprises. A farmer could
 
transfer his capital to industrial pursuits or use the income
 
from his capital to underwrite new ventures. Flexibility was,
 
and remains, the key to the economic success.
 
The overall effects of land reform were less striking in
 
Korea where the most significant results ;ere political as much
 
as economic. In 1912 the Japanese colonial government of Korea
 
replaced the prior system of ill-defined ownership with a set of
 
strong legal guarantees on the private ownership of ].and. At the
 
same time they carried out the first complete land survey

undertaken in Korea. In the process the government acquired

ownership of about 58% of the agricultural land in the country.
 
In 1947 the U.S. military administration, which had replaced

the Japanese at the end of the war, redistributed the land of the
 
departing Japanese to Korean farmers. Subsequently the Korean
 
government carried out several further distributions of land
 
ownership so that while only 16.5 percent of the rural
 
population owned land in 1947, 71.2 percent owned +heir own land
 
by 1974. 
These reforms were widely supported in the countryside
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but not by the Rhee government. In fact, the reform legislation
 
was passed over Rhee's veto and led to retaliations against

political opponents and the press.2
 
Until 1971 the Korean government's policy was to use PL480
 
food imports under the U.S. foreign aid program to keep the urban
 
price of food below market cost. Although the productivity of
 
the Korean farmer was artificially low for over 25 years after
 
the initial reform, land ownership was a major factor in ensuring
 
a relatively even distribution of income in Korea. Also, the
 
pattern of land ownership helped to support the pervasive and
 
unregulated domestic capital and credit market which was so
 
important to the Korean economy when economic growth got
 
underway.
 
Land reform in Korea had a much smaller effect on
 
industrialization than on Taiwan. One factor was the chaos
 
surrounding the industrial facilities taken over from the
 
Japanese. As noted earlier, the combination of poor

administration by the U.S. occupation and the lack of top
 
management experience left Korean industry in disarray.
 
Following the war, it simply did not exist in meaningful terms.
 
IMPORT-LED GROWTH POLICIES
 
Corruption and mismanagement figured large in press reports

of the U.S. aid program in Korea. By its very nature and the
 
degree of fungibility involved, any aid program which transfers
 
funds to foreign government officials will have the same problems
 
whether they are visible of not. In the Korean case the Wall
 
Street Journal produced some scathing reviews. In 1964 it was
 
reported that the Korean aid program was out of control. A major
 
complaint was that:
 
The U.S. intended that its aid dollars be spent at least in
 
part, on factories capable of turning out products for
 
export or to replace products that would otherwise have to
 
be imported. Instead, local businessmen, with government
 
help, have lavished foreign exchange on equipment for plants
 
to make lipstick, cigarettes, stockings and similar items -­
t
mainly for the local market."

The article in question went on to complain that the Korean
 
government was using U.S. aid funds to import television sets,
 
musical instruments and other luxuries. It was asserted that aid
 
officials were being naive in allowing the Korean government to
 
decide what it would import with our money. Furthermore, the
 
article described the dangerous state of the Korean economy, with
 
massive unemployment, rising inflation, rapid population growth,
 
and faced with the necessity of importing most of the resources
 
required to run a an economy.
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The Koreans did indeed invest in the production of what the
 
aid observers and other outsiders chose to call luxuries. It is
 
quite clear that they also used some of their artificially scarce
 
foreign currency to purchase imports which did not match the
 
requirements of the planning models of the time. In the light of
 
the ultimate performance of the Korean economy we can only assume
 
that they were doing something right.
 
In fact, there is a strong argument that the Koreans of the
 
early 1960's were laying the appropriate foundation for the
 
economic miracle to come. It can also be argued that the
 
expenditure of foreign aid on these so-called luxuries was 
a more
 
productive use of funds than the spending on capital intensive
 
projects which were so popular at the time.
 
The explanation lies in the acceptance of two postulates:
 
1. Economic development is about people. It occurs when
 
people are willing to work and sacrifice for rewards which
 
will come to them as individuals in the foreseeable future.
 
2. Baubles and pointless luxuries to the outside may be
 
the stuff of dreams to the person who must do the work and
 
make the sacrifice.
 
Given suitable incentives people are capable of economic
 
success in a nation as crowded and resource poor as Korea. With
 
unsuitable incentives they are capable of economic stagnation in
 
a naticn as sparsely populated and as resource rich as Zaire.
 
Economic planners always work from an esoteric world of
 
models and factors of production. Real people work for dreams
 
and goals which directly involve themselves and those they lovc.
 
The outsidcr cannot know what will motivate individual people in
 
the longer run. The outsider cannot know the lengths to which
 
some individuals will go in pursuit of the dream represented by a
 
trinket or toy.
 
To the extent that the Koreans circumvented plans for
 
develop-Zng their economy and used U.S. aid to create incentive
 
goods they may have laid a real foundation for a sticcessful
 
economic future.
 
The pattern of export incentives developed under Park
 
indicates a continuing recognition of the importance of imports.
 
Almost every export promotion incentive involved access to
 
imports. Most important among these was the right to virtually

unlimited imports of raw materials with an accompanying right to
 
resale in the protected local market. While solid data are not
 
available, the rush of entrepreneurs to the thinly profitable
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export sector indicates that profits from sales of restricted
 
imports 	were a substantial incentive to enter export industries.
 
In combination with factors such as well-defined and
 
enforceable property rights and limited government intervention,
 
the availability of imported incentive goods became a critical
 
factor. Until the mid-1960's Korea's economic performance was no
 
better than that of other less developed nations. Furthermore,
 
up to that time Korea restricted imports of "non-essentials".
 
The Korean balance of trade remained fairly stable until the
 
end of the period. When the policy of export led economic
 
develcpment began under the Park regime a startling change in the
 
balance of payments data took place: imports grew faster than
 
exports until well into the 1980's. If there was a leading
 
sector it was imports and not the increase in exports which
 
followed.
 
Table 1
 
Imports, Savings and the Balance of Payments
 
South Korea: 1956-1971
 
(millions of US$)
 
YEAR IMPORTS SAVINGS* BOP
 
1953 109.4 -3.8 -92.4
 
1954 78.1 2.7 -67.8
 
1955 104.8 1.0 -91.9
 
1956 122.4 -0.4 -110.9
 
1957 144.8 -1.6 -129.2
 
1958 125.3 0.4 -105.6
 
1959 102.6 2.4 -79.7
 
1960 117.5 1.7 -90.1
 
1961 106.6 4.0 -68.4
 
1962 141.2 4.8 -98.2
 
1963 179.2 4.2 -133.0
 
1964 133.3 5.7 -76.2
 
1965 149.6 9.1 -69.3
 
1966 237.9 11.7 -115.6
 
1967 320.7 13.9 -154.7
 
1968 468.0 15.6 -233.0
 
1969 583.8 17.0 -273.7
 
1970 642.4 16.5 -261.2
 
1971 773.6 14.3 -314.2
 
1972 801.2 15.5 -157.9
 
Source: 	Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics
 
Yearbook, 1973. pp.260-261.

*As a percentage of GNP
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Taiwan was intriguingly similar. The initial conditions of a
 
respect for private property were established through effective
 
land reform and the domestic capital market operated despite
 
government policies to constrain it. When imports were
 
liberalized 
- earlier than was the case in Korea - the rate of
 
economic growth and the level of exports exploded.
 
Until the surge of exports at the end of the period Taiwan's
 
imports grew at a faster rate than imports. Later, with the
 
exception of two years while Taiwan was adjusting to the oil
 
price shocks of the 1970's, its balance of payments moved into a
 
surplus and grew at an accelerating rate. Note that it was only

after 1965 that Taiwan liberalized the import market in parallel
 
with the domestic credit market and these a-e the factors which
 
in combination spurred economic growth.
 
Taole 2
 
Taiwan Merchandise Imports 1950-70
 
(millions of US$)
 
Yenr Imports BOP* 
0 123.90 -30.80 
11-5 184.70 -57.60 
1960 286.50 -122.50 
1965 517.20 -66.40 
1970 363.40 105.20 
Source: Financial Statistics
 
Monthly, Central Bank of
 
China. Various issues.
 
A Balance of Payments
 
on Merchandise trade
 
We have already made the point that U.S. aid paid for 
a
 
substantial portion of Korea's agricultural imports in the early
 
years. It is interesting to note, however, that total imports
 
continued to rise as the aid funded portion declined. This might

indicate that with appropriate domestic economic policies the
 
commodity import portion of the aid program was at best
 
marginally important for Korea's economic success.
 
Similarly, the standard assumption that imports are
 
inversely related to the level of domestic saving is not borne
 
out in the Korean case. Table 1 shows that domestic savings rose
 
as a percentage of GNP as the level of imports increased. The
 
plausible explanation for this is that the availability of
 
imports is an added incentive to save. The tangible presence and
 
availability of desirable goods may be a strong incentive to
 
consumer behavior which we observed in the United States in the
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past when consumer credit was less readily available: people
 
saved to buy what they wanted but could not afford at the time.
 
Again it is interesting to note that the same thing had
 
happened on Taiwan under similar circumstances several years

before. With import liberalization the rate of domestic savings
 
rose.
 
Table 3 
Net Domestic Savings on Taiwan 
As a % of National Income 
(1952-75) 
YEAR SAVINGS % 
of NI
 
1952 5.2
 
1955 4.9
 
1960 7.6
 
1961 8.0
 
1962 7.6
 
1963 13.4
 
1964 16.3
 
1965 16.5
 
1970 23.8
 
1975 25.3
 
Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1981. As quoted in
 
Tsiang, S.C., "Taiwan's Miracle: Lessons in Economic
 
Development," in World Economic Growth, Case Studies of
 
Developed and Developing Nations, Edited by Arnold C.
 
Harberger, ICS Press, San Francisco, 1984. Table 6, p.319.
 
Until the late 1950s the Korean government followed a
 
restrictive import and foreign investment policy. After 1962 both
 
were reversed. Imports had been liberalized considerably during

the late 1950s and in 1962 the incentives for foteign investment
 
were increased substantially. All restrictions on the proportion

of foreign to domestic ownership were removed as were all
 
restrictions on the repatriation of profits. Korea borrowed
 
abroad in substantial amounts at the same time. The fungibility

of funds means that the foreign exchange made availab].e by

foreign direct investment and foreign borrowing permitted the
 
balance of payments to support the trade deficits which resulted
 
from the rapid increase in imports.
 
A footnote to the increased flow of imports which began in
 
the 1960"s is its relation to import substitution. The Korean
 
government of President Park followed a two-pronged policy of
 
export promotion and import substitution. The rising tide of
 
imports would indicate that the import
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substitution part of the program was not very effective in the
 
short-run. We cannot say when import substitution took over as a
 
natural part of the growth process, but it was not in the years

when the government was most actively pursuing an import
 
substitution policy.
 
THE CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES
 
Earlier we cited the importance of common education to the
 
success of aid efforts in the ROC. As much as imparting a common
 
economic frame of reference to administrators on both sides,
 
their common educational experiences provided them with a common
 
cultural experience. In Korea prior to the mid-1960"s this
 
commonality through education was lacking. What was present in
 
Korea, however, was a cultural and spiritual influence at once
 
more profound and lasting - the Christian missionaries.
 
The Korean Christian churches and American missionaries
 
kept alive the flame of Korean nationalism during the hialf
 
century of Japanese occupation. As the major non-Japanese

external influence, they had a profound effect on the traditional
 
cultural and political relationships of Korea. Between 1952 and
 
1962, forty-one percent of the members of the cabinet came from
 
the 8 percent of the population which was Christian."
 
The churches did more than provide food, clothing, medical
 
services and religious consolation to people in need. They were
 
responsible for a substantial amount of grade school and high

school education and much of the university education. The first
 
modern university in Korea was founded by Underwood, the
 
missionary who is still revered as a national figure in Korea.
 
In the strongest sense they provided direct foreign aid.
 
A stated aim of foreign aid administrators has always been
 
to work themselves out of a job, to replace themselves with
 
locals as soon as possible. The missionary element of the Korean
 
churches seems to have been peculiarly adept at this. They

consistently developed local skills and then retired from the
 
scene. Evidence indicates that the churches operated a lean
 
administrative structure and that a high proportion of their
 
limited funds went into direct action.
 
The churches in Korea did as much of their training as
 
possible locally, and when they wanted to send Koreans abroad
 
they sent them to institutions which gave highly specific

training and cost as little as possible in the process.

Furthermore, their idea of appropriate education and training was
 
based upon the experience they had gained establishing and
 
running schools and universities in Korea.
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They built on a U.S. model modified in the light of their
 
experience in Korea and other less developed countries. They

also relied heavily on apprenticeships and on-the-job-learning,
 
not only because these were effective methods of acquiring
 
specific skills but because they provied the environmental
 
knowledge and work discipline without which skills alone are
 
frequently wasted.
 
The Christian churches also contributed to economic
 
development by providing role models for those they taught. The
 
purpose of missionaries is, after all, to influence religious

choice rather than to stimulate economic growth. The proximity
 
to the people required for this in'timate influence has resulted,
 
however, in a profound cultural change. Confucian attitudes
 
toward commerce and material rewards have been mixed with
 
Christian ideas of a linkage of secular and spiritual success.
 
The rapid growth of Christianity during the period of rapid

economic growth and the fact that the largest Christian church in
 
the world is located in Seoul are testimony to the influence of
 
these early missionaries.
 
CONCLUSION
 
Every indicator which our research has developed suggests

that economic success in the Republic of China and the Republic

of Korea resulted from economic policies based on market
 
determined allocations of resources in an environment of well
 
defined and protected property rights.
 
Formal economic development planning institutions were
 
established in China and Korea but their actual role in the
 
economy was that of follower rather than leader. Tn Korea,
 
planning in the high foreign aid years was an exercise designed
 
to extract the maximum amount of aid possible from the United
 
States. On Taiwan, the role of macro-economic planners was
 
overshadowed by the decentralized orientation of the aid program

and the widely disbursed pattern of entrepreneurial activity.
 
The foundation upon which later economic success was built 
consisted of an effective land reform which gave clear title to 
the people responsible for agricultural output while maintaining 
secure property rights to other forms of assets throughout the 
economy. It also consisted of government policies which eschewed 
direct and pervasive intervention in the economy outside of heavy
 
industry.
 
In neither of the subject nations was economic aid a
 
determining factor in economic growth. It was never meant to be.
 
In Korea, it was essential to the survival of the Korean people

following the Korean War and was seen by the U.S. Congress as 
an
 
essential part of maintaining Korean defenses against the
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Communist North Koreans. 
On Taiwan, aid eased the transition of
 
the Nationalist government but was initiated as part of the
 
efforts to maintain strategic allies during the Korean War. As
 
much as anything else, the aid program for the ROC was a
 
guarantee that Chiang Kai Shek would provide assistance in the
 
war, including maintaining the real potential for a second front.
 
With aid now considered an entitlement by many recipient

nations it is useful to remember that neither the ROC nor the ROK
 
ever believed that aid would bring growth. They were both happy
 
to have it to be sure, but in both nations aid was seen as a
 
temporary expedient to be used as a bridge to domestically

generated prosperity. Especially in the case of Korea, where the
 
U.S. press repeatedly criticized the use of aid and made
 
references to Korea as a "basket case," 
the national leadership

and the people were anxious to gain economic independence.23
 
The success enjoyed by aid programs in Korea and Taiwan was 
the establishment of market-oriented policies. The aid programs, 
per se, did not achieve this success. They were a bridge between 
the market economy of the donor and the policy makers of the 
recipients. In essence, the ability of the donor to establish 
the aid program provided a continuing reminder of the wealth 
which could be achieved by a market economy. 
Therefore, if one feature of the aid programs which
 
contributed to their success had to be singled out it would
 
clearly be that they were bilateral. Like the economic
 
relationships which existed on Taiwan between old landlords and
 
new, there was an explicit mutual obligation. The recipient and
 
donor understood that the program would exist only so long as it
 
served the national agenda of both nations. The obligations

incurred in such a system provided an incentive for achievement.
 
The turn to multilateral. economic assistance, which occurred
 just as the ROC and ROK were making their ascent, has severely

damaged this necessary linkage between donor and recipient. The
 
faceless bureaucracy of the World Bank and its sist:er
 
institutions, with no sovereign agenda and no moral puirpose
 
cannot hope to provide the example provided by the direct
 
contribution of the American people in Korea and Taiwan. 
The
 
attempted separation of economic policy from political and
 
national security issues ignores the very basis on which
 
democratic capitalist nations are built. Only through the
 
integration of these elements in 
a unified program can foreign
 
aid be beneficial.
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12. Krueger, Anne 0., The Developmental Role of the Foreign

Sector and Aid, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1979.
 
P.21.
 
13. Cole, David C,. and Yung Chul Park, Financial Developments
 
in Korea, 1945-78, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
 
This book presents the whole story of the UMM, its size, its
 
role, and the effect of the two times during which the government

tried to eliminate or control it. See also: Kim, Joong-woong,

"Economic Development and Financial Liberalization in Korea:
 
Policy Reforms and Future Prospects," Working Paper No. 8514, The
 
Korean Development Institute, Seoul, Korea, December, 1985.
 
14. ibid, p.264.
 
15. Kim, Kwang Suk, and Michael Roemer, Growth and Structural
 
Transformation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1979, p.3
 .
 
16. The rapid increase in world sugar prices in 1.964 and the
 
increase in banana exports after 1963 were the final impetus for
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clear property rights. "Reforms" such as these merely set the
 
stage for future conflict.
 
18. There was the inevitable government land grab. The Taiwan
 
Sugar Corporation, a nationalized firm which benefitted greatly
 
from this transfe~r, continues today as a vestige of that land
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grab.
 
19. The disastrous land confiscation in El Salvador again offers
 
a comparison. The major estates there were actively managed by

the landowners. Confiscation of their land (no corresponding
 
property right was provided in El Salvador, only worthless
 
government bonds) was accompanied by the "need" to establish
 
government administered collectives to assure continuity.
 
Workers were provided shares of the collective which were non­
transferable. Thus, landowners and workers were alienated from
 
the land as well as from each other. Only the socialist sponsors

of the land confiscation program could justly claim victory.
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14.
 
22. Cole and Lyman, p. 15.
 
23. Korea differs in this case markedly from the ROC. Chiang

Kai Shek's government was not anxious to see the aid program
 
ended as it eschewed any reduction in cooperation between the
 
Nationalist government and its only major ally. Korea faced
 
similarly hostile enemy but had almost total international
 
support. The U.S. press - as during the 1988 Olympics - found
 
itself incapable of recalling why the Korean people had been
 
divided and impoverished following World War II and was unwilling
 
to explore the depth of feelings of the Korean people at having

been needlessly sacrificed in the defeat of Japan, its colonial
 
master.
 
